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ISSUES PRESENTED 
Whether Judge Conder committed reversible error in 
granting hospital's motion for summary judgment one week before 
trial when Hoopiainia failed to support his claim of medical 
malpractice with expert testimony that hospital's actions caused 
his alleged injuries. 
Whether Judge Conder committed reversible error in 
denying Hoopiiaina's motion to compel discovery of medical 
records information pertaining to hospital patients not a party 
to this action, when State law and hospital regulations require 
that medical records information be kept confidential* 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following determinative statutes, rules and regula-
tions are set forth in relevant part in the addendum: Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. §§78-14-1, 3 and 5 (1953 as 
amended); Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e); Utah State Depart-
ment of Health, Hospital and Psychiatric Hospital Rules and 
Regulations, Medical Records Department, Chapter 7.404 (1984 
Revision). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. This is a medical malpractice 
action in which plaintiff-appellant Ben K. Hoopiiaina 
("Hoopiiaina") seeks damages for injuries allegedly caused by an 
unauthorized 200 mg. oral dosage of quinidine which he was given 
while being treated at the LDS Hospital ("hospital")• 
B. Proceedings and Disposition Below. On April 11, 
1983, Hoopiiaina served a summons and complaint upon hospital, 
alleging that during his hospitalization, in January of 1981, he 
was given medication which had been ordered for another patient 
and that this caused permanent and disabling injuries to his 
lungs and cardiovascular system. (R. at 5). 
Hoopiiaina served interrogatories upon the hospital, 
asking for the name and address of the patient who was to have 
received the quinidine that was mistakenly administered to him 
and for the names and addresses of the physicians who were treat-
ing this patient. Hospital refused to provide this information 
on the grounds that it was required by state law and professional 
regulations to protect the privacy of the unidentified patient 
("patient X" ) and that disclosure of the requested information 
would violate this responsiblity. (R. at 55, 129). Hoopiiaina 
moved to compel discovery. Judge Conder found that the hospital 
had a duty to protect the confidentiality of medical records 
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information pertaining to patient X and that disclosure of such 
information was not provided for by the Utah Code or Utah 
Hospital Rules and Regulations. Consequently, Hoopiiaina's 
motion to compel was denied, (R. at 139). 
On February 8, 1984, hospital moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that plaintiff was unable to establish his 
claims through expert medical testimony. Hospital admitted that 
Hoopiiaina was mistakenly given a 200 mg. tablet of quinidine 
ordered for another patient in the same room but introduced 
expert medical testimony that the medication caused Hoopiiania no 
harm, (R; at 111-116). Hoopiiaina failed to submit competent 
contradictory testimony, admitted he did not have an expert and 
asserted he would have one before trial. Relying on this asser-
tion, Judge Conder denied hospital's motion for summary judgment 
without prejudice. (R. at 159). 
On March 5, 1984, hospital filed a certification of 
readiness for trial. Hoopiiaina did not object and the case was 
given a first place trial setting for September 24, 1984. 
Hoopiiaina made no objection to this trial setting. (R. at 137, 
141, 159). 
Hospital renewed its motion for summary judgment on 
July 30, 1984. Hoopiiaina again failed to submit expert testi-
mony that the unauthorized medication caused harm. Judge Conder 
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admonished Hoopiiaina's counsel that he could not go to trial 
without expert testimony of causation. Counsel explained that he 
was still trying to obtain an expert. (R. at 147, 159). 
At a September 17, 1984, conference, one week before 
trial, Hoopiiaina still had no expert. Hoopiiaina's counsel said 
that he knew a doctor and "hoped he would testify as to causa-
tion." At this time Judge Conder granted hospital's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure 
to show causation of injuries through competent medical testi-
mony. (R. at 159, 160). 
C. Statement of Facts . Hoopiiaina was admitted to the 
hospital on January 5, 1981. At the time of admission, 
Hoopiiaina had a long history of chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease and congestive heart failure. (R. at 116). 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 9, 1981, Wilda 
K. Cruz, R. N., a hospital employee, mistakenly gave Hoopiiaina 
a 200 mg. tablet of quinidine ordered for another patient in the 
same room. No further dosages of quinidine were administered to 
Hoopiiaina during his stay in the hospital. (R. at 111-112). 
Hoopiiaina was released from the hospital on January 
12, 1981. On April 11, 1983, he commenced this action, alleging 
that his respiratory and coronary problems were caused by the 
quinidine tablet and other unidentified medication given during 
his hospitalization. (R., at 5). 
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To fully investigate these allegations, hospital 
retained Dr. Michael Allan Peat, Associate Director of the 
University of Utah's Center for Human Toxicology, Dr. Peat, a 
biochemical pharmacologist and forensic toxicologist, carefully 
reviewed Hoopiiaina's medical records, his deposition taken on 
November 30, 1983, and the Affidavit of Wilda K. Cruz, R.N. (R. 
at 115) . 
Dr. Peat concluded that the 200 mg. tablet caused no 
harm and that Hoopiiaina suffered from chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease and congestive heart failure prior to his 
admission to the hospital on January 5, 1981. Dr. Peat's 
testimony, is that "the single 200 mg. oral dosage of quinidine 
given to Mr. Hoopiiaina did not cause any of the injuries of 
which Mr. Hoopiiaina complains. (R. at 116) (Emphasis added). 
Hoopiiaina introduced no medical testimony to rebut Dr. 
Peat's findings or to establish that his alleged injuries were 
caused by hospital's actions. Instead, he countered with his own 
affidavit that he "was advised by the medical staff that he was 
given the medication quinidine, which should have been given to 
the patient in the same room. Also the blood thinner was a wrong 
medication." (R. at 119). His affidavit also stated that he had 
no knowledge of the amount of quinidine given but that he 
"developed all of the symptoms that are associated with the over-
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dose of quinidine as reported by the pharmaceutical company in 
the Physician's Desk Reference Book" (R. at 119). This was the 
only evidence offered in opposition to hospital's multiple 
motions for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In medical malpractice actions plaintiff's are required 
to introduce expert testimony to establish that the defendant's 
actions caused the injuries complained of. Whether Hoopiiaina 
relies upon negligence, lack of informed consent or battery as 
his theory of recovery, he has the burden of obtaining expert 
medical testimony that the unauthorized administration of 
medication caused harm. 
Hospital introduced expert medical testimony that 
Hoopiiaina was suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease and congestive heart failure prior to his admission to 
the hospital and that the administration of a 200 mg. dosage of 
quinidine caused no harm. Hoopiiaina introduced no expert 
testimony that was contrary. There is no dispute as to the 
amount of unauthorized drugs administered because Hoopiiaina 
submitted no evidence to rebut Nurse Cruz's testimony that only a 
single 200 mg. tablet of quinidine was given. 
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Hospital is under a legal and professional obligation 
to keep medical records information confidential and to protect 
the privacy of its patients. Judge Conder acted appropriately in 
denying Hoopiiaina's motion to compel disclosure of medical 
records information of a patient not a party to this action. 
Summary judgment is the time for parties to establish 
that they can prove their case at trial. By failing to introduce 
expert testimony that the unauthorized administration of 
quinidine was the cause of Hoopiiaina's chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease and congestive heart failure, Hoopiiaina 
subjected his claim to summary dismissal. Judge Conder was 
correct in ruling, as a matter of lawf that there were no 
material issues in dispute as to whether Hoopiiaina's injuries 
were caused by Hospital's actions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SINCE HOOPIIAINA FAILED TO SET FORTH SPECIFIC FACTS 
SHOWING GENUINE ISSUES FOR TRIAL, JUDGE CONDER 
APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED HIS COMPLAINT. 
Because Hoopiiana failed to submit competent evidence 
that the hospital's actions caused him harm or that he was given 
unauthorized medication in addition to a 200 mg. tablet of 
quinidine, there were no genuine issues for trial and Judge 
Conder appropriately dismissed his complaint. Rule 56(e) of the 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment when 
the party resisting a motion for summary judgment relies upon 
"the mere allegations or denials of his pleading" to oppose 
competent evidence submitted by the moving party. The Rule 
provides that 
When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him, 
U.R.C.P. 56(e). 
On three occasions, hospital supported its motion for 
summary judgment with competent evidence that the only 
unauthorized medication given was a 200 mg, tablet of guinidine, 
which caused no harm. 
On each occasion, Hoopiiaina responded only with his 
own affidavit reiterating the bare, unsupported allegations set 
forth in his pleading, and failing to show that there were any 
genuine issues for trial. The record below is therefore devoid 
of any competent evidence in support of Hoopiiaina1s claims, and 
summary judgment was appropriate. 
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A. Judge Conder Acted Appropriately in Dismissing 
Hoopiiania's Complaint For Failure to Provide 
Expert Testimony in Support of His Claim that the 
Hospital's Actions Caused Him Harm. 
At summary judgment, Hoopiiaina was required to 
introduce expert testimony to raise a genuine issue as to whether 
the hospital's actions cause him harm. 
This Court has consistently held that a plaintiff, in 
medical malpractice actions, must introduce expert testimony to 
establish (1) the standard of care, (2) defendant's failure to 
comply with that standard and (3) that defendant's action caused 
the injuries alleged. The purpose of this requirement is to 
assist the trier of fact in deciding medical/legal issues which 
are outside the experience and understanding of the average 
citizen. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). 
Hospital admits giving Hoopiiaina an unauthorized 
dosage of quinidine but denies that this caused him any harm. 
Hoopiiaina has the burden of obtaining expert medical testimony 
that harm resulted. Id. at 352; Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 
233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957)? Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 
139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943) . 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a jury 
decision for the plaintiff because the plaintiff submitted no 
expert testimony that defendant's omissions were the proximate 
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cause of the injuries complained of. The court held that evi-
dence of the defendant's negligent conduct alone was insufficient 
and that it was necessary for the plaintiff to introduce expert 
medical testimony that what the defendant did or failed to do 
"caused the end result". Id. at 220. The court declared that 
In the absence of such expert testimony there 
is nothing upon which a jury can base its 
finding on the proximate cause of the injury. 
A jury may not conjecture or speculate, but 
must have substantial evidence upon which to 
base a verdict. 
Id. 
At the time of summary judgment in this case, the only 
competent evidence of causation before the court was Dr. Peat's 
testimony that the tablet did not cause any of the injuries of 
which Hoopiiaina complained. There being no competent evidence 
to the contrary, Judge Conder appropriately found that there were 
no issues for trial and granted summary judgment in favor of the 
hospital. 
Hoopiiaina cites Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 6 04 
P. 2d 474 (Utah 1979) and argues that summary judgment should not 
have been granted because hospital admits giving the unauthorized 
medication. That clearly is not the issue at hand. Rather, the 
issue upon which Judge Conder appropriately based his decision 
was Hoopiiaina's failure to establish, by competent expert testi-
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mony, that the administration of the unauthorized medication 
caused the injuries alleged. As argued above, Hoopiiaina, not 
the hospital, has the burden of establishing causation through 
expert testimony. Moreover, in Farrow, this Court overturned the 
district court decision because the plaintiff had produced expert 
testimony as to both negligence and causation of injuries. In 
the case at hand, Judge Conder appropriately dismissed the 
complaint because Hoopiiaina produced no expert testimony. 
B. Because Hospital Introduced Expert Testimony That 
its Actions Did Not Cause "Any of the Injuries" of 
Which Hoopiiaina Complained, No Dispute Over 
Liability For Medical Expenses Exists. 
Hoopiiaina argues that he was required to stay in the 
hospital an additional three days, incurring expenses for 
hospitalization and medication for which he should be reimbursed. 
These claims remain nothing more than that—bare unsubstantiated 
claims without a whisper of expert testimony in support. 
Dr. Peat's uncontradicted testimony is that the 
administration of a 200 mg. tablet of quinidine neither caused 
nor aggravated Hoopiiainafs pre-existing chronic pulmonary and 
corony disease. Dr. Peat also specifically testified that the 
medication "did not cause any of the injuries of which Mr. 
Hoopiiania complains." (R. at 114). Since Hoopiiaina failed to 
establish causation of injuries, Judge Conder properly found that 
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there were no issues for trial regarding hospital's liability for 
medical expenses. 
C. Because the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
Requires Hoopiiaina to Prove That Hospital's 
Unauthorized Treatment Caused Him Harm, Dismissal 
of his Unsupported Battery Claim, was Appropriate. 
Hoopiiaina attempts to circumvent this Court's deci-
sions requiring expert testimony on the issue of causation by 
characterizing a portion of his action as one sounding in common 
law battery. Such attempts were contemplated by the Utah legis-
lature in enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. 
§78-14-1 et seq. ("Act"). The Act codified the elements of all 
Malpractice claims and replaced the common law right to bring 
battery claims arising out of health care. The Act covers all 
malpractice claims by broadly defining malpractice as 
Any action against a health care provider, 
whether in" contract, tort, breach of warran-
ty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon 
alleged personal injuries relating to or 
arising out of health care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by the health care 
provider. 
Id. at §78-14-3 (29) (emphasis added). The Act also broadly 
defines health care as: 
Any act, or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or 
furnished, by any health care provider for, 
to, or on behalf of a patient during the 
patient's medical care, treatment or 
confinement. 
Id. at §78-14-3 (30) (emphasis added). 
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These comprehensive definitions brought every conceiv-
able personal injury claim which could arise out of a patient's 
treatment in a health care facility under the provisions of the 
Act* Consequently, common law claims for assault and battery, 
arising from health care treatment in the State of Utah, are 
replaced by this statutory action of "failure to obtain informed 
consent". JcU at §78-14-5.l 
Since Hoopiiaina's battery claim arises from an act 
performed during his confinement in the hospital, the Act 
requires that he prove that the alleged battery caused injuries 
i.e. that "the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was 
the proximate cause of the personal injuries suffered by the 
patient." Id. at (l)(g). 
As argued above, proof of causation in medical malprac-
tice actions, such as this, must be by expert testimony. Nixdorf 
v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). Judge Conder therefore 
appropriately dismissed Hoopiiaina's battery claims for failure 
to show causation of injuries through expert testimony, as 
required by the Act. To hold otherwise would permit plaintiffs 
1
 The title of the Act sets forth the legislature's intent 
to provide "for a codification of the elements of a malpractice 
action based upon failure to obtain informed consent." Annot. 
U.C.A. §78-14-1. 
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to circumvent and frustrate the legislature's intent—to codify 
all related health care actions—by merely classifying their 
claims as sounding in battery. 
D. Because Hoopiiaina Introduced No Evidence That He 
Was Given Unauthorized Medication,, in Addition to a 
200 mg. Tablet of Ouinidine, There Is No Dispute As 
to The Amount of Unauthorized Medication 
Administered, 
Hoopiiaina argues that the amount of unauthorized 
medication given is in dispute and claims his counter affidavit 
rebuts Nurse Cruz's testimony about a single 200 mg. tablet. 
Hoopiiaina's affidavit, however, states that he does not know how 
much quinidine he was given. (R. at 119). Judge Conder 
appropriately found no disputed facts as to the amount of 
unauthorized medication given. 
In addition, Hoopiiaina's affidavit speculates he was 
given an unauthorized dosage or dosages of blood thinner. At 
summary judgment, he submitted no evidence to support this 
speculation or to show that if unauthorized blood thinner was 
given that it caused harm. To the contrary, Hoopiiaina's 
affidavit declares that his injuries are associated with the 
administration of quinidine not blood thinner. (R. at 119). 
Even if Hoopiianina's affidavit was competent, which it is not, 
Judge Conder correctly found that it raises no issues for trial 
as to the amount of medication given or whether it caused harm. 
-15-
II. JUDGE CONDER ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN PROTECTING THE 
PRIVACY OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS BY DENYING HOOPIIAINA1S 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF MEDICAL RECORD 
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO A PATIENT NOT A PARTY TO THIS 
ACTION. 
Hoopiiaina's interrogatories nos. 20 and 21 requested 
that the hospital divulge the name and address of the patient for 
whom the quinidine he received had been ordered ("patient X"). 
Hoopiiaina also asked for disclosure of the name and address of 
the physician treating patient X. (R. at 55). 
Because neither patient X nor his/her physician are a 
party to this action the hospital is legally obligated to keep 
this information confidential. Hospital Rules and Regulations 
for the State of Utah require that the identity of patient X and 
information contained in his/her medical record be safeguarded 
and released only to authorized persons. These rules require 
that 
E. All records shall be kept confidential. 
F. Only authorized personnel shall have 
access to the records. 
Go The patient or his legal representative 
must give written consent to release medical 
information to unauthorized persons. 
Utah State Department of Health, Hospital and Psychiatric 
Hospital Rules and Regulationsr Medical Records Department, 
Chapter 7.404 (1984 Revision). 
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Provisions of the Utah Code support the State 
Department of Health's requirement of confidentiality. Under the 
Code, a patient's notarized written authorization is required 
before medical records can be copied or inspected by his or her 
own attorney. U.C.A. $78-25-25 (1953 as amended). See also 
U.C.A. §§26-25-1 et seq. which requires that all information 
concerning the treatment of hospital patients be held in strict 
confidence by the State Department of Health. 
Standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Hospitals ("JCAH")* the national governing and administrative 
body responsible for the accreditation of hospitals, also forbid 
the unauthorized release of patient information. JCAH standards 
state that 
The medical record is the property of the 
hospital and is maintained for the benefit of 
the patient, the medical staff, and the hos-
pital. It is the hospital's responsibility 
to safeguard both the record and its informa-
tional content against loss, defacement, and 
tampering, and from use by unauthorized 
individuals Particular emphasis should be 
given to protection from damage by fire or 
water. 
Written consent of the patient or his 
legally qualified representative is required 
for release of medical information to persons 
not otherwise authorized to receive this 
information. . . . 
JCAH, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, Medical 
Records Services, p. 88 (1983). 
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The laws and regulations of this state do not permit 
the hospital to disclose the name and address of patient X and of 
his/her physician. To the contrary, such disclosure is expressly 
prohibited. In a case similar to the present one, the Arizona 
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. That court vacated an 
order requiring a defendant/physician to disclose the names and 
addresses of former patients who were not parties to the 
malpractice lawsuit in which he was involved. Ziegler v. 
Superior Court, 650 P.2d 181 (Ariz. 1982). The court's ruling 
was based upon a statutory patient/physician privilege, requiring 
that medical information be kept confidential. 
Even though the names and addresses of the physician's 
former patients might have provided useful information to the 
plaintiff, the court denied discovery. It was found that 
The challenged order of the respondent court 
undermines the privilege by having the 
respondent doctors disclose the indentity of 
the patients they had treated. Disclosure of 
such information even to the trial court is 
nevertheless disclosure which is not author-
ized. The former patients are entitled to be 
left to their privacy secure in the belief 
that their confidences, treatment, and " 
records are protected from disclosure. 
Id. at 182. 
See General Motors v. NIOSH, 459 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. 
Ohio 1978) (a patient's medical records should not be disclosed 
to federal investigative agency). 
Compelling the hospital to divulge the identities of 
patient X and of his/her physician would violate confidentiality 
requirements imposed by the Utah legislaturef the State 
Department of Health and JCAH standards and would breach patient 
Xfs expectation of privacy. Such disclosure would also subject 
the hospital and its staff to possible civil liability to patient 
X for invasion of privacy and breach of contract. Additionally, 
the State Department of Health and JCAH might impose sanctions 
for violation of confidentiality requirements. 
Judge Condor therefore acted appropriately in finding 
that the hospital had a duty to safeguard the privacy of patient 
X and the confidentiality of his/her medical records. This court 
should uphold Judge Condor's order denying plaintiff's motion to 
compel discovery of such information. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is the time for parties to establish 
that they will be able to prove their case at trial. On three 
occasions Hoopiiaina was given the opportunity of showing, 
through competent expert testimony, that hospital's actions 
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caused him harm. No such evidence was ever submitted. 
Consequently, Judge Conder's order dismissing this action, just 
one week before trial, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
day of April, 1985, 
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eputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEN Kc HOOPXIAINA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 




Civil NOc C83-103 
On March 2, 1984, Defendant's, LDS Hospital, Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's, Ben K. Hoopiiaina, Motion to 
Compel were heard before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
the Plaintiff being present through his counsel of record, Matt 
Biljanic and the Defendant being present through its counsel of 
record, Norman J. Younker. 
The Court having considered the Affidavits and 
Memoranda of Points and Authorities submitted herein and the 
n, MeConkto 
Bushiwll 
saonal Corporation j 
S 300 EAST 
r LAKE CITY 
TAH 84111 138 
argument of counsel, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is premature. The Court also finds that the 
Plaintiff seeks to compel discovery of medical records and 
information contained in the medical records of Patient X, an 
individual who is not a party to this litigation and that 
Defendant, LDS Hospital, is under a statutory, regulatory and 
professional obligation to protect the confidentiality of such 
medical records and information and to secure the privacy of its 
patients and that the discovery of this information under the 
circumstances of this case is not provided for by either the Utah 
Code or the Utah Hospital Rules and Regulations which both 
require that such medical records and the information contained 
therein be kept confidential. Based upon the foregoing it is 
hereby ORDERED that Defendant's, LDS Hospital, Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's, Ben K. 
Hoopiiaina, Motion to Compel discovery of Patient X's medical 
Kirton, McConki* 
& Buthnell 
A Professional Corporation 
330 S 300 EAST 
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SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 84111 
records and information contained therein is denied, 
DATED this / *-r day of March, 1984. 
BY THE COURT; 
Dean E. Conder, 
Third District Judge 
'~ ATTEST 
ROIXOWHtNOL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE If j X j 2 ^ ^ S l ^ ^ ^ ^ 
(/ Deputy C-n-vV 
This is to certify that I hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER on this the /P"day of 
March, 1984 to the following? 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
7355 South 900 East 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
•3-
Health Care Malpractice Act, 
U.C.A. §78-14-1 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act." 
U.C.A. §78-14-3. 
(1) "Health Care Provider" includes any person, partnership, 
association, corporation or other facility or institution who 
causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional 
services as a hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed 
practical nurse.... 
(25) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a 
health care provider, under a contract, expressed or implied. 
(28) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or 
negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury 
or damage to another. 
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" 
means any action against a health care provider, whether in 
contact, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, 
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out 
of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider. 
(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or 
furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by 
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient 
during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement. 
U.C.A. §78-14-5. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health 
care provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care 
provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be 
done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care 
provider in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain 
an informed consent the patient must prove the following: 
(c) The patient suffered personal injuries arising out of 
the health care rendered; and. . . 
(g) The unauthorized part of the health care rendered was 
the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient. 
5 
O.C.A. §78-25-25 
Whenever an attorney at law duly licensed to practice in the 
State of Utah is authorized to represent the interest of a 
patient of any physician, surgeon, dentist, osteopathic 
physician, registered nurse, psychologist, chiropractor, or a 
licensed hospital and that attorney desires to examine or to 
obtain copies of any of the patient's records in the custody or 
control of such person or hospital, those records shall be made 
available, at the regular place of business of the person or 
hospital having custody or control thereof, for inspection and 
copying by the attorney if he presents to such person or hospital 
a written authorization signed and acknowledged by the patient 
before a notary public, or in the case of a minor, by a parent or 
guardian, or in the case of a deceased patient, by the personal 
representative or an heir. Such records shall remain in the 
possession of the person or hospital having custody or control 
thereof and the attorney shall pay, as part of the costs advanced 
on behalf of his client, for all copies made at his request. 
6 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an 
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, and adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
7 
Utah State Department of Health, Hospital and Psychiatric 
Hospital Rules and Regulations, Medical Records Department 
Chapter 7.404 (1984 Revision). 
D. Medical records are the property of the hospital and 
shall not be removed from the hospital's control except 
by court order or subpoena. 
E. All records shall be kept confidential. 
F. Only authorized personnel shall have access to the 
records. 
G. The patient or his legal representative must give 
written consent to release medical information to 
unauthorizd persons. 
8 
J.C.A.H. Accredidation Manual for Hospitals 
Medical Records Services, p. 88 (1983) 
The medical record is the property of the hospital and is 
maintained for the benefit of the patient, the medical staff, and 
the hospital. It is the hospital's responsibility to safeguard 
both the record and its informational content against loss, 
defacement, and tamperingf and from the use by unauthorized 
individuals. Particular emphasis should be given to protection 
from damage by fire or water. 
Written consent of the patient or his legally qualified 
representative is required for the release of medical information 
to persons not otherwise authorized to receive this information. 
9 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I caused to be mailed four true 
and correct copies of the foregoing, Brief of Respondent 
Intermountain Health Care dba LDS Hospital, postage prepaid, 
this <*} day of April, 1985, to: 
Matt Biljanic 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Ben K. Hoopiiaina 
7355 Sotfth 9th East 
Midv^fe, Utah 84047 
